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"MEDICOVER": A PROPOSAL FOR 
NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE 
Maxwell J Mehlman t 
INTRODUCTION 
On October 28, 2006, a group of health policy experts participated 
in a workshop at Case Western Reserve University School of Law to 
design a program to provide affordable health insurance for all 
Americans. The result was "Medicover." 
The discussion proceeded from seven working assumptions: 
1. All Americans must have access to affordable health in-
surance. 
2. The private sector by itself cannot provide this. 
3. Nor can the states. 
4. The more the government restricts private choice, the less 
likely that a health insurance program will be adopted. 
5. People dislike creating new bureaucracies. 
6. The most efficient administrative system for health insur-
ance is Medicare. 
7. Any new program administered by Medicare must not in-
terfere with the existing Medicare program. 
The result was a program with the following key features: 
1. Congress should create and Medicare should administer a 
new federal health insurance program. 
2. Health insurance under the program should be available to 
anyone who wants or needs it. 
t The workshop was made possible by the generosity of Peter Weinberger, a 
member of the fmn of Spangenberg, Shibley & Liber LLP and a graduate of Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law, and by his fundraising efforts, which led 
to support from the law fmns of Baker Hostetler and Porter Wright Morris & Arthur 
LLP. Additional funding was provided by the School of Law through the Law-
Medicine Center, which hosted the workshop. The author would like to thank Gary 
Broadbent for his research assistance. 
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3. While the new program should be administered by Medi-
care, it should not reduce the benefits of or the funding for 
the current Medicare program. 
4. The new program should be voluntary. 
5. The new program should provide an adequate package of 
basic benefits. 
6. The new program should employ best practices to keep 
costs down. 
7. Those who can afford it should pay premiums, based on 
ability to pay. 
8. Those who cannot afford to pay full premiums should be 
subsidized by the government. 
9. States should be permitted to enroll their Medicaid benefi-
ciaries in the program upon payment of suitable premi-
ums. 
10. Employers should be permitted to enroll employees in the 
program upon payment of suitable premiums. 
11. Since the new program would be administered by Medi-
care and would provide health insurance coverage, its 
name would be "Medicover." 
This Article provides a description of the events leading up to the 
workshop, the discussion that took place, and the proposal that 
emerged. The proposal is intended to be a discussion document rather 
than a fmal product. It needs greater detail, a clearer sense of its costs 
and financing mechanisms, and input from stakeholders. Nevertheless, 
the workshop participants believe that Medicover may be a viable 
option for helping to solve the current health care crisis. 
I. THE CURRENT HEALTH CARE CRISIS 
One of the gravest crises facing the United States today is the 
state of our health care system. The facts are not in dispute: The price 
of health care is increasing at almost three times the rate of inflation. 1 
Nearly 46 million Americans are uninsured, an increase of 6 million 
since 2000.2 Fewer employers, the source of health insurance for most 
Americans, are offering it to their employees. 3 An additional 16 
1 See Cynthia Smith et al., Trends, National Health Spending in 2004: Re-
cent Slowdown Led by Prescription Drug Spending, 25 HEALTH AFF. 186, 186, 193 
(2006). 
2 CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, 
POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2004 16 
(2005), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p60-229.pdf. 
3 See Sherry A. Glied & Phyllis C. Borzi, The Current State of Employment-
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million Americans are considered "underinsured" based on their high 
out-of-pocket expenses relative to their incomes.4 "[T]wo of five 
Americans-insured and uninsured alike-have trouble paying their 
medical bills or have accrued [significant] medical debt."5 People who 
lack adequate health insurance have difficulty managing chronic 
conditions and are much less likely to get preventive care. When they 
do receive care, it is frequently in the emergency room, the most ex-
pensive fonn of primary care. Lack of health insurance leads to an 
estimated 18,000 excess deaths each year. 6 In addition, the impact of 
this situation reaches far beyond the circumstances of any individual 
family: a recent Commonwealth Fund study estimates that health 
problems among working-age Americans and their families cost an 
estimated $260 billion in lost productivity each year.7 
At the same time, the United States is the only industrialized 
country that lacks a comprehensive national health insurance program. 
This demonstrates that providing affordable access to an adequate 
package of health care benefits clearly is feasible. Jost's article offers 
a number of explanations for why the U.S. has not followed the path 
ofthe rest of the world: 
Explanations tend to focus on five factors, each of which 
seems to play a role, though commentators disagree on their 
relative importance: U.S. political institutions; the U.S. social 
culture and character; a weak left and the limited strength of 
unions in the U.S.; the political power of provider and insurer 
interest groups; and the strength of path dependency.8 
Based Health Coverage, 32 J.L. MEn. & ETHICS 404 (2004). 
4 Cathy Schoen et al., Insured But Not Protected: How Many Adults Are 
Underinsured?, HEALTH AFF., June 14, 2005, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/ 
content/1ong/h1thaff.w5.289/DC1; see also SARA R. COLLINS ET AL., THE 
COMMONWEALTH FUND, GAPS IN HEALTH INSURANCE: AN ALL-AMERICAN PROBLEM 
15, 20 (2006), available at http://www.cmwf.org/usr_ doc/Collins _gapshltins_920.pdf 
(twenty-eight percent of all working-age adults reported being underinsured in 2005). 
5 THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, HEALTH INSURANCE: AN OVERVIEW, 
http://www .cmwf.org/GeneraVGeneral show.htm?doc id=318887 (last visited Mar. 
13, 2007); see also MICHELLE M. Dorr ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, SEEING 
RED: AMERICANS DRIVEN INTO DEBT BY MEDICAL BILLS 3 (2005), available at 
http://www.cmwf.org/usr doc/837 Doty seeing red medical debt.pdf. 
6 INSTITUTE oF MEmciNii, cill WITHou:Y CoVERAGE: Too LITTLE, Too 
LATE 163 (2002). 
7 KAREN DAVIS ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, HEALTH AND 
PRODUCTIVITY AMONG U.S. WORKERS 4 (2005), available at http://www.cmwf.org/ 
usr _doc/~ 56 
7 
Davis_ hit _productivity_ USworkers.pdf. 
T1mothy Stoltzfus Jost, Why Can't We Do What They Do? National 
Health Reform Abroad, 32 J.L. MEn. & ETHICS 433, 437 (2004). 
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Perhaps it would be desirable if these factors did not exist. But the 
U.S. cannot solve its health care crisis by pretending that they do not. 
These realities impose a number of constraints on the possible 
solutions. A single-payer system is likely to be the cheapest and the 
most equitable, which is why it is the model for most of the rest of the 
world. But the private health insurance industry, which wields 
enormous political power, is no more likely to allow itself to be 
eradicated now than during the Clinton health reform initiative of the 
early 1990s. Some large employers, moreover, believe that they can 
obtain a better deal on group health benefits from private insurers than 
from the government. Americans do not seem willing to deny 
themselves the right to purchase health care on the private market. 
Consequently, any proposal for solving the insurance crisis must 
accommodate private insurance. Finally, Americans hate being forced 
to do things by the government. They prefer to govern their own lives, 
even if the decisions they make prove unwise or cause them harm. 
These attitudes not only doom the creation of a single-payer 
system, but also most proposals for government-run national health 
insurance. Several Democrats have urged adoption of "Medicare-for-
All," which would eliminate private health insurance and require 
everyone to enroll in Medicare.9 In August of 2006, Congressman 
Stark introduced a bill to establish "Americare," which would require 
all Americans to purchase a health insurance plan approved by the 
govemment. 10 Neither of these proposals stands much chance of being 
adopted. Massachusetts recently passed a law creating a program to 
insure all state residents. Governor Schwartzenegger has proposed a 
similar plan for California. I I The details of these programs have yet to 
be worked out, and it is not clear if they will survive the need for 
various restrictions and financing charges. In any event, the wide 
disparities in state resources mean that many states will be unable to 
afford a comparable system. Unless the nation is prepared to accept a 
patchwork of state-by-state health insurance plans with significantly 
different degrees of coverage, including some states that have no 
programs at all beyond Medicaid, state action is not the solution. 
9 United States National Health Insurance Act, H.R. 676, 109th Cong. 
(2005); see also Robert Pear, The Health Care Debate: The Legislation; Bill Passed 
by Panel Would Open Medicare to Millions of Uninsured People, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 
1994, at Al2. 
10 AmeriCare Health Care Act of2006, H.R. 5886, 109th Cong. (2006). 
11 Press Release, Governor of California, Gov. Schwarzenegger Tackles 
California's Broken Health Care System, Proposes Comprehensive Plan to Help All 
Californians (Jan. 8, 2007), available at http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/ 
press-release/5057 /. 
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A uniquely American approach might be to rely on the private 
sector to solve the crisis. But the private sector has tried without 
success to do this for the past fifty years. Community-rated, not-for-
profit hospital and physician plans that emerged in the 1930s could 
not compete with commercial, for-profit companies, which led to 
fragmentary rather than population-wide insurance delivered at high 
administrative cost. Employer-based group insurance filled the breach 
in many cases but has become so expensive that it is being offered by 
fewer and fewer firms, while small employers and self-employed 
individuals are priced out of the health insurance market unless their 
risk factors make them unlikely to require health care in the first 
place. In the 1980s and '90s, the private sector experimented with 
managed care to restrain spending, which essentially shifted insurance 
risk from insurers to providers. This failed when health care 
professionals and their patients resisted attempts by managed care 
plans to place them in an adversarial relationship in order to constrain 
the consumption of health care services. The latest effort by the 
private sector is "consumer-driven health care." The theory is that 
health care costs can be controlled by making "consumers," i.e., 
patients, pay a significant portion of their health care expenses, 
thereby giving them an incentive to be frugal. This is merely another 
attempt by third-party payers to shift risk away from themselves, with 
the bizarre twist that it is now the patients themselves, rather than 
insurers, employers, or health care professionals, who are expected to 
make wise purchasing decisions. Yet, no one has explained how 
patients-especially those who are seriously ill-have the knowledge, 
expertise, time, and emotional fortitude to make such choices, and the 
result is bound to be a health policy disaster. The only explanation 
offered by the private sector for this succession of failures is 
goverment interference: If its hands had not been tied by governinent 
regulation, the market would have been more successful. But in this, 
market proponents make the same error as advocates of a single-payer 
system-the nation is no more likely to eliminate public constraints 
on the private sector than it is to eliminate the private sector itself. 
Against this backdrop, the options for effective change are lim-
ited, but they do exist. What is necessary is a voluntary, federally-run 
program that assures patients an adequate package of affordable 
health care services, keeps administrative costs low, and controls costs 
without making physicians adversaries toward their patients. 
This rules out one often-made suggestion: that the federal em-
ployee health insurance program be made available to persons who 
are not federal employees. This program is not run by the federal gov-
ernment but by private insurance companies such as Blue Cross/Blue 
Shield. It does not provide an adequate package of services, and the 
6 HEALTH MATRIX [Vol. 17:1 
scope of coverage is constantly shrinking. It does not effectively con-
trol its costs, despite utilizing a full range of cost control techniques. 
Consequently, premiums are constantly rising. 
One option would be to create a new government bureaucracy to 
administer this program. This was the thrust of the Clinton health re-
form initiative. It planned to establish an extensive set of new agen-
cies at both the state and federal level. This feature was seized upon 
by opponents, chiefly the private health insurance industry, as too 
much government and was one of the main reasons the initiative 
failed. People do not like big bureaucracies, and they especially do not 
like to create new ones. 
Fortunately, there is no need to. Unquestionably, the best-run in-
surance program in the country is Medicare. Its administrative costs 
are the lowest, averaging approximately three to six percent, as com-
pared with an average of twelve to thirteen percent for private plans. 12 
Its beneficiaries are generally highly satisfied with how it functions. 
The oruy significant administrative problems with Medicare have oc-
curred in connection with the new Part D dmg plan, and this is due to 
Congress's misguided attempt to delegate the bulle of the administra-
tive responsibilities to private insurers. 
The workshop, therefore, concentrated on designing a new, fed-
eral health program open to all Americans and administered by Medi-
care. 
II. WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS 
In addition to myself, the following experts participated in the 
workshop: 
• Timothy S. Jost, Robert L. Willet Family Professor of 
Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law. 13 
12 JEFF LEMIEUX, CTR. FOR POLICY & RESEARCH, AM.'s HEALTH INS. PLANS, 
PERSPECTIVE: ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS OF PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS, 
http://www.ahipresearch.org/pdfs/ Administrative_ Costs_ 030705.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 14, 2007) (noting that Medicare's low administrative costs of three to six per-
cent may not be comparable to the private sector for various reasons, including the 
fact that the administrative costs do not include the cost of capital to service Medi-
care, which alone might increase the actual cost by about seven percent). 
13 Professor Jost was named Willett Professor of Law in 2001. Earlier, he 
was Newton D. Baker, Baker & Hostetler Chair of Law and Professor at the College 
of Medicine and Public Health at Ohio State University. From 1987 through 1992, he 
was a member of the Ohio State Medical Board. He is an expert on comparative 
health law and author of numerous articles and books, including: TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS 
lOST, HEALTH CARE COVERAGE DETERMINATIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE 
STUDY (2004), Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Our Broken Health Care System and How to 
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• Theodore Marmor, Ph.D., Professor of Public Policy and 
Management, Professor of Political Science, Yale Univer-
sity.J4 
• Marilyn Moon, Ph.D., Vice President and Director of the 
Health Program, American Institutes for Research. 15 
• J.B. Silvers, Ph.D., Elizabeth M. & William C. Treuhaft 
Professor of Health Systems Management, Professor, 
Banking and Finance, Weatherhead School of Manage-
ment, Case Western Reserve University. 16 
7 
Fix It, 41 Wake Forest L. Rev. 537 (2006), and Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Why Can't We 
Do What They Do? National Health Reform Abroad, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHJCS 433 
(2004). 
14 Professor Marmor's scholarship focuses on welfare state politics and pol-
icy in North America and Western Europe, with emphasis on major spending pro-
grams. He authored THEODORE R. MARMOR, THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE (Aldine 
Transaction, 2d ed., 2000) and, with Mashaw and Harvey, THEODORE R. MARMoR ET 
AL., AMERICA'S MiSUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE: PERSISTENT MYTHS, ENDURING 
REALITIES (1990). Author or co-author of eleven books, Professor Marmor has pub-
lished over a hundred articles in scholarly journals. Professor Marmor began his ca-
reer as a special assistant to Wilbur Cohen (Secretary of HEW) in the 1960s. He was 
Associate Dean of Minnesota's School of Public Affairs, on the University of Chi-
cago faculty, the head of Yale's Center for Health Services, a member of President 
Carter's Commission on the National Agenda for the 1980s, and a senior social policy 
advisor to Walter Mondale during the 1984 Presidential campaign. Professor Marmor 
received his Bachelor's Degree from Harvard College in 1960 and his Ph.D. from 
Harvard University in 1966. 
15 Marilyn Moon is a nationally-known expert on Medicare. She has also 
served as a Senior Fellow at the Urban Institute and as a public trustee for the Social 
Security and Medicare trust funds. Dr. Moon has written extensively on health policy, 
both for the elderly and the population in general, and on social insurance issues. Her 
most recent book, MARlL YN MOON, MEDICARE: A POLICY PRIMER (2006), was pub-
lished by the Urban Institute Press in 2006. From 1993 to 2000, Moon also wrote a 
periodic column for the Washington Post on health reform and health coverage issues. 
She has served on a number of boards for non-profit organizations and is currently 
President of the board of the Medicare Rights Center and is a board member for the 
National Academy of Social Insurance. She is a member of the Institute of Medicine 
of the National Academy of Sciences. Dr. Moon earned a Ph.D. in economics from 
the University of Wisconsin-Madison, where her work focused on the health and 
economic status of the elderly. Previously, she has been an associate professor of 
economics at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, a senior analyst at the Con-
gressional Budget Office, and the founding Director of the Public Policy Institute of 
the American Association of Retired Persons. 
16 J.B. Silvers has been on the Weatherhead faculty since 1979. He is also 
Professor of Epidemiology & Biostatistics at Case Western Reserve University 
School of Medicine. Professor Silvers teaches health finance, strategic financial man-
agement and value creation, and health policy and management decisions. His re-
search focuses on health finance/insurance, pharmaconomics, mergers, and public 
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• Joseph White, Ph.D., Chair, Department of Political Sci-
ence, Luxenberg Family Professor of Public Policy, Direc-
tor of the Center for Policy Studies, Case Western Reserve 
University. 17 
III. ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF A MEDICOVER 
PROGRAM 
The two days of discussion during the workshop centered on a 
number of key issues. What benefits should Medicover provide? 
Should the program impose the same limits on benefits as the Medi-
care program? If not, what effect would this have on Medicare itself? 
What would Medicover cost, and how would it be financed? How 
would the program control costs? How serious a problem would be 
posed by adverse selection, and how can it be prevented? Could 
Medicover compete effectively with p1ivate insurers? How should 
Medicover relate to employer-based health insurance? To Medicaid? 
What political realities would confront a Medicover proposal, and is it 
politically feasible? 
Given the limited amount of time available during the workshop, 
few of the issues can be said to have been discussed fully, much less 
resolved. What follows is a summary of the discussion. Numbers in 
parentheses are references to pages of the official transcript of the 
policy. His book chapter, The Role of the Capital Markets in Restn~cturing Health 
Care, appeared in PETER J. HAMMER ET AL., UNCERTAIN TIMES: KENNETH ARROW AND 
THE CHANGING ECONOMICS OF HEALTH CARE 156 (2003). He is the author of numer-
ous scholarly articles on business and epidemiology. Professor Silvers received his 
B.S in Engineering (1965) and his M.S.I.A. (1966) from Purdue University. In 1971, 
he earned a Ph.D. from Stanford University. He serves on a number of boards for 
medical organizations, including the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health-
care Organizations (Oakbrook Terrace, Illinois). 
17 Dr. Joseph White received his A.B. from the University of Chicago and 
M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of California, Berkeley. Dr. White's research has 
focused on American federal budget politics and policies; health care finance policy 
and politics; and "reform" of Social Security and Medicare. Among his books are 
JOSEPH WHITE, FALSE ALARM: WHY THE GREATEST THREAT TO SOCIAL SECURITY AND 
MEDICARE IS THE CAMPAIGN TO "SAVE" THEM (2001) and JOSEPH WHITE, COMPETING 
SOLUTIONS: AMERICAN HEALTH CARE PROPOSALS AND INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
(1995). He authored the entry on National Health Care & Insurance Systems in the 
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 10299-
10303 (2001) and the entry on The Cost of Health Care in Western Countries in 
EDWARD J. BENZ, OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE (4th ed. 2003). 
Also participating in the workshop was William J. Scanlon, Ph.D., Senior 
Policy Advisor, Health Policy R&D, who provided an introductory presentation on 
fmancing and cost issues and contributed to the discussion based on his experience 
with Medicare administration and payment policies. 
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workshop proceedings. The final section of this report identifies the 
numerous questions that remain. 
One aspect of the workshop is striking, however. Relatively little 
concern was expressed about how Medicover would be fmanced and 
whether the nation could afford its price tag. In part, this is attribut-
able to the preliminary nature of the proposal and the time limitations 
of the workshop. But more fundamentally, it reflects a consensus 
among the participants that the time is long past for this country to 
provide affordable health insurance for all. If every other advanced 
country can afford do so, so can we, the wealthiest country of all. 
Surely difficult questions remain about the extent to which employers 
would be expected to finance premiums for employees, how much 
individuals would be required to contribute on behalf of themselves 
and their families, and the nature and size of any necessary tax in-
creases. One way or another, answers to these questions must be 
found. To some extent, as Professor Jost explained during the work-
shop, they can be gleaned from the experience of other countries. But 
the question can no longer be whether we can afford a national health 
insurance alternative. The only question now must be how. 
A. What Benefits Should Medicover Provide? 
One of the key features identified in advance for the Medicover 
program is that it "should provide an adequate package of basic bene-
fits." Mindful of cost concerns, some health policymakers have advo-
cated the creation of an inexpensive, bare-bones health insurance op-
tion for the uninsured. But the solution to the health insurance crisis 
should not be to create more people who are under-insured. The goal 
of Medicover should be to meet the needs of both the uninsured and 
the underinsured. The workshop agreed that a meaningful health in-
surance alternative must provide a comprehensive benefits package, 
including inpatient and outpatient care, physician and ancillary ser-
vices, drugs and durable medical equipment, and home and hospice 
care. 
Another issue tackled by the workshop participants was the need 
for Medicover to place a cap on individual out-of-pocket spending-
often referred to as a "catastrophic cap" since it is likely to be trig-
gered by an expensive, catastrophic episode of illness. Medicare has 
no such cap. Due to deductibles, co-insurance, co-payments, premi-
ums, and lifetime limits, the average Medicare beneficiary currently 
pays about fmty-five percent of his or her health care costs out-of-
pocket (207). The closest thing to caps under Medicare is the ability to 
deduct health care expenditures from federal income taxes if they ex-
ceed seven and a half percent of adjusted gross income and to qualify 
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for Medicaid once the individual has exhausted virtually all of his or 
her assets. Many Medicare beneficiaries become impoverished as a 
result. In contrast, the German system pays all health care costs once 
individual spending exceeds two percent of income. The workshop 
participants did not specify what the Medicover cap should be but 
agreed that one was necessary. 
There was considerable discussion about whether or not to include 
Part C of Medicare in Medicover. Part C, originally called Medi-
care+Choice and now "Medicare Advantage," was added in 1997 as 
an effort to privatize Medicare by permitting beneficiaries to contract 
with private health insurance plans for their Medicare benefits. Part C 
authorizes both managed care plans and private versions of the tradi-
tional Medicare fee-for-service approach. The workshop participants 
strongly felt that Part C should not be included in Medicover because 
its plans fail to achieve the administrative savings of the Medicare 
program itself ( 409). 
Finally, the workshop participants mentioned the need to consider 
whether Medicover would provide long-term care (nursing home) 
benefits but did not discuss the issue in detail (412). 
B. What Would Medicover Cost? 
As noted above, there was relatively little concern about whether 
Medicover would be affordable. Nor did the workshop make a serious 
attempt to calculate how much the program would cost. One partici-
pant estimated its cost at between $40 and $70 billion a year, but only 
if all current expenditures for the uninsured, including the money 
spent on community health clinics and uncompensated care, and the 
funds that providers recoup by shifting the costs of the uninsured to 
the insured, could be captured and the funds added to the Medicover 
budget. But the participants acknowledged that this would be ex-
tremely difficult to achieve (425-26). One heartening point about costs 
was the observation that public programs already provided coverage 
for the most expensive patient population, namely, Medicare benefici-
aries (291). This segment of the population accounts for seventeen 
percent of total health care spending. 18 
C. How Would Medicover Contain Costs? 
A key feature of Medicover would be the use of "best practices" 
to control costs. The workshop participants agreed that Medicover 
18 THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE: MEDICARE SPENDING 
AND FINANCING (2005), available at http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/7305.pdf. 
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needed to do a better job of containing costs than Medicare, but time 
constraints did not permit an extensive discussion of what cost con-
trols should be employed. Participants noted the need for limitations 
on both the price and the volume (or "intensity") of services, since, as 
the experience with Medicare's efforts to restrain physician payments 
has shown, fee limits alone cannot check spending (412). An addi-
tional type of cost control would be restrictions on Medicover expen-
ditures, such as annual global budgets for providers or payment ad-
justments based on targeted rates of growth. There was also discus-
sion of the need for limitations on coverage, including requiring that 
new, costly technologies demonstrate not only that they are safer or 
more effective than existing alternatives, but that they are more cost-
effective, that is, that they are the least expensive means to achieve a 
desired outcome. Moreover, unlike Part D, the new Medicare drug 
benefit, Medicover should have the authority to negotiate prices with 
drug manufacturers, which most likely would require use of a drug 
formulary to limit access to drugs whose manufacturers refused to 
give the program a sufficient discount on price. 
D. How Would Medicover Be Financed? 
The workshop addressed a number of elements of Medicover fi-
nancing. Individuals would pay premiums on the basis of ability to 
pay (421). Premiums would be subsidized for those who could not 
afford to pay the full premium but effectively also for those who were 
ill or at high risk of illness and who, therefore, could not afford to pay 
the high premiums that they would be charged by private insurers 
(257). There was considerable debate about whether premiums should 
be set according to a person's income or some other measure, such as 
wealth (252). The former is administratively simpler but less progres-
sive, favoring persons with large amounts of non-income-generating 
assets. It was noted that both Medicaid and Part D of Medicare em-
ploy asset tests (394). One option is to place a ceiling on how much 
income or wealth would be counted for purposes of calculating Medi-
cover premiums, similar to the cap on income for paying FICA taxes 
(260). 
There was interest in the capitalized system used in Germany, in 
which an individual's premiums are placed in an interest-bearing ac-
count so that they decline over time. If individuals were required to 
pay deductibles, co-payments, or co-insurance, these should be as-
sessed on a lump-sum basis rather than piecemeal for each type of 
care, as under Medicare, and the amount of cost sharing should vary 
on the basis of the patient's ability-to-pay (423-24). There was discus-
12 HEALTH MATRIX [Vol. 17:1 
sion of the problem of insuring illegal aliens, but no solution offered 
(387). 
E. Adverse Selection 
One of the most troublesome threats to a voluntary program like 
Medicover is adverse selection. This occurs when individuals refrain 
from purchasing insurance until they are ill and then drop it once they 
recover. It also occurs when individuals or firms drop private insur-
ance in order to take advantage of premium subsidies under the public 
program. The more this occurs, the more those paying full premiums 
under Medicover will be persons requiring health care and the less it 
will be healthy individuals whose premiums can help pay for that 
care. Adverse selection is a dynamic effect in that premiums increase 
as the proportion of enrollees who require health care increases, which 
in tum drives up premiums even further. This phenomenon, lmown as 
the insurance death spiral, ultimately destroys the insurance plan be-
cause insureds pay for their care in full. 
Medicover will face this threat so long as enrollment is voluntary. 
Healthy individuals either will not purchase health insurance at all or 
will obtain more favorable rates from private plans. The only people 
who will enroll in Medicover are those who cannot afford private in-
surance or who would have to pay more for private insurance than for 
Medicover. 
The classic solution to the problem of adverse selection is to re-
quire everyone to be insured under the program, but this violates the 
basic objective that Medicover should be voluntary. So does the par-
tial response of requiring everyone to have some form of health insur-
ance. One other approach is to make people help finance Medicover 
whether or not they enroll. Enrollment in Medicover would remain 
voluntary but paying for it would not. This is similar to the Australian 
system (235). Another alternative is the Gennan system of capitalized 
premiums, mentioned earlier, where the longer individuals delay en-
rolling, the higher their premiums will be. In order to discourage peo-
ple from enrolling in Medicover when they need health care and then 
dis-enrolling when they become well, Medicover could also emulate 
the German system, which prevents persons from re-enrolling in the 
public health insurance program once they leave it (199). 
Another problem created by making Medicover voluntary is the 
risk that lower-wage employers who previously helped pay for health 
insurance for their employees will cease to do so in the expectation 
that their employees will obtain subsidized coverage under Medi-
cover. This may be less of a problem in the future as fewer low-wage 
employers provide health insurance to their employees, but it will still 
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be a threat. The solution again is either to make employers pay for 
Medicover whether or not they provide it to their employees or at least 
to require some payment by employers who drop private insurance 
once Medicover becomes available. 
On the other hand, the workshop participants acknowledged that it 
is difficult, if not impossible, to predict the amount of adverse selec-
tion that would occur or its impact on the fmancial viability of a 
Medicover program. The workshop participants, therefore, decided 
that, rather than establish mechanisms in advance to deal with adverse 
selection that might turn out not to be a serious problem, it made more 
sense to require the program to monitor the problem and take steps to 
reduce it in the future if they became necessary ( 401 ). 
F. Cherry-Picking 
Another basic premise of Medicover is that it would provide an 
alternative to, rather than a replacement for, private health insurance. 
This leaves the private sector free to "cherry-pick," that is, to offer 
low-cost plans to healthy segments of the population, thereby drawing 
these groups away from the Medicover pool of insureds. In a sense, 
this makes Medicover a high-risk pool, insuring those who are not 
sufficiently profitable for the private sector. 
The workshop participants bad no problem with the private sector 
selling supplemental insurance to Medicover enrollees for items and 
services that Medicover did not cover and, since Medicover itself pre-
sumably would pay for all medically necessary care, participants saw 
no need for the premiums for these policies to be subsidized for those 
less able to pay (416). However, it might be necessary for the gov-
ernment to limit and standardize the supplemental policies that could 
be sold to prevent the confusion and duplication of coverage that 
characterized the market for Medigap policies prior to government 
intervention (415). 
One way to deal with cherry-picking would be to require private 
plans to help fmance Medicover. Another approach, which was part of 
the Clinton reform proposal, would be to subsidize private plans in 
return for insuring higher-risk individuals. As in the case of adverse 
selection, however, the degree and effect of cherry-picking cannot be 
ascertained in advance. It is quite possible that enough people will 
enroll in Medicover that it would have enough purchasing power to 
compete effectively with smaller private plans by negotiating price 
discounts from providers. Therefore, the participants agreed that 
Medicover should monitor cheny-picking and only adopt mechanisms 
to deal with it if it became problematic. 
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G. Employers 
Employers would be permitted to buy Medicover for their em-
ployees. There was extensive discussion of how to calculate employer 
premiums. Experience-rating was rejected on the basis that it would 
discourage employers from hiring employees with disabilities or other 
high-risk factors (383). But participants thought that rates could vary 
according to the sex and age of employees and the type of industry. If 
an employer provided Medicover, it would have to cover all employ-
ees ( 402). Employees could be required to pay a portion of the premi-
ums by having it deducted from their wages (271). The workshop 
considered, but did not resolve, whether Medicover should employ a 
play-or-pay type of mandate in which employers who did not enroll 
their employees would have pay a Medicover tax to help finance 
Medicover. 
H. Medicare 
A core objective of Medicover is that it is not seen as a threat to 
the current Medicare program, lest it excite opposition from powerful 
lobbying groups representing seniors. Accordingly, the financing for 
Medicover should not come from resources that are necessary to sus-
tain Medicare. As the workshop unfolded, however, it became clear 
that a number of recommendations were being put forward that would 
render Medicover more generous in certain respects than Medicare 
(415 ff.). These included placing a limit on the amount of out-of-
pocket expenditures by enrollees and subsidizing enrollees who could 
not afford to fully pay deductibles, co-payments, and co-insurance. 
Ideally, these features would be added to Medicare. But the partici-
pants were cognizant that budget concerns might make that unrealis-
tic, in which case Medicover would face pressure to abandon these 
features despite their desirability. 
I. Medicaid 
States should be pennitted to terminate their Medicaid programs 
in favor of enrolling Medicaid-eligibles in Medicover. In that case, the 
state would transfer its Medicaid budget to the Medicover program, 
while the federal government would transfer to Medicover what it 
would have contributed to pay for the former state program. 
J. Political Realities 
No health reform proposal is a good proposal if it does not stand a 
chance of being adopted. The Medicover proposal contains a number 
of features that some might not regard as ideal, such as being volun-
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tary and not being accompanied by an individual or employer health 
insurance mandate. Medicover is not a single-payer system. It is an 
incremental change. At best, it will not solve the entire problem posed 
by the lack of universal health insurance. 
These ostensible shortcomings are part of the proposal for a rea-
son, however. They are intended to give the proposal a chance at life. 
At the least, the workshop participants felt that the proposal deserves 
to be developed further and to play a role in the growing national de-
bate that will culminate in calls for action during coming presidential 
elections. 
The workshop was heartened by the lessons from abroad. Medi-
cover has analogues throughout the world. Typically, countries have 
moved toward universal health insurance incrementally, and, charac-
teristically, they have relied on a combination of public and private 
insurance in doing so. 
The concluding session of the workshop explored the political 
landscape for health insurance reform and how Medicover would fare 
in the political arena. One source of opposition is bound to be the drug 
industry, which will feel threatened by the prospect of lower drug 
prices as the result of Medicover' s negotiating strength. Yet it is likely 
that by the time Congress addresses Medicover, Medicare itself will 
have been given the authority to negotiate drug prices under Part D. 
The major opposition to Medicover would come from the private 
health insurance industry and from market advocates who reject gov-
ernment as the solution to the health insurance crisis. One of the key 
objectives of making Medicover voluntary is to blunt the objections of 
private insurers. Medicover will not force anyone to abandon private 
insurance and, unless it turns out to be necessary down the road, will 
not interfere in any way with the ability of private insurers to offer 
better terms to segments of the population at lower risk for ill health. 
Those who promote competition as the way to restrain prices can con-
sider Medicover as a means of injecting a dose of real competition 
into the health care system. If private insurers compete effectively, 
they will continue to thrive. However, it will be clear to the private 
sector that Medicover may grow sufficiently large that it gains far 
greater bargaining power than individual private insurers. Eventually 
Medicover may "crowd out" much of the private insurance sector. 
Opposition from that sector may be somewhat weakened by some of 
Medicover's features, but it will still be fierce. 
It is critical, therefore, that the Medicover proposal garners the 
support of interest groups powerful enough to offset its opponents. 
Unfortunately, those who would most benefit from such a program-
the un- and under-insured-lack an organized political voice. The one 
exception is self-employed individuals, who wield influence through 
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various independent and small business trade associations ( 44 7). Sup-
port for Medicover may come from unions, who may see it as a partial 
solution to the loss of employment-based health benefits (446). Or-
ganized social progressives would be supportive if they were willing 
to set aside their preference for more comprehensive change. Fiscal 
conservative groups might get behind the proposal if they felt that it 
would help rein in health care spending (349). Other potential key 
allies are health care providers. The question is whether they would be 
frightened off by Medicover' s cost controls or would see the program 
as a source of greater revenues by financing access to health care for 
patients who do not now receive adequate services or cannot pay for 
them (307). 
A final key source of support for Medicover, however, could be 
large employers (343). They might endorse the program if they 
viewed it as a cost-effective method of promoting a healthy workforce 
and as the best way to avoid more draconian insurance mandates. It, 
therefore, is critical that large employers be part of the coalition that 
designs and backs the proposal. 
IV. WHERE TO GO FROM HERE 
The October 2006 workshop was only the first step in what has to 
be an extended process. It has produced the bare bones of a proposal, 
to which critical details must now be added. Among the details are 
such central features as how Medicover would be financed, how it 
would control spending, and how much it can be expected to cost. 
It is also noteworthy that the workshop presenters were all health 
policy experts rather than stakeholder representatives. None were 
physicians, hospital administrators, or health insurers (although one 
person, J.B. Silvers, had previously served as the chief executive of a 
managed care plan). There were no business owners, union officials, 
or corporate officers. These stakeholders now need to be brought into 
the process so that their suggestions are considered and their objec-
tions noted and, ideally, addressed. 
The next steps, thus, are clear: to continue to flesh out the Medi-
cover program and to present a more complete plan to a convocation 
of key constituents. In the meantime, you can play a role by directing 
any comments or suggestions to me at The Law-Medicine 
Center, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, 11075 East 
Boulevard, Cleveland, Ohio 44106, or e-mail me at mjm10@case.edu. 
